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(Concluded.)
It was not until 1884 that this question was presented to
the House of Lords in Mersey Co. v. Naylor et al., L. R.,
9 App. Cases 434. This case is peculiar both in its facts and
the opinions therein delivered.
The facts are fully set forth in the report of the decision
of the case in the Court of Appeals, L. R., 9 Q. B. D. 648.
They were as follows: Naylor & Co., the defendants,
agreed to purchase 5,000 tons of steel blooms to be delivered
at Liverpool in monthly installments of I,ooo tons, payment
within three days after receipt of shipping documents.
The plaintiff's company delivered in January one-half the
first installment, but before payment became due a petition
was presented to wind up the company. The defendants
were advised by their solicitors that they could not, without
leave of the Court, safely pay the company pending the petition and asked the company to obtain an order sanctioning
the payment. This the company refused to do, and notified
the defendants that they would treat the failure to pay as a
breach, terminating the entire contract. The case being
tried before Coleridge, C. J., he held that there had been a
refusal to pay, which amounted to a repudiation of the contract, and gave the plaintiffs the right to rescind, saying:
"Here the defendants, while insisting upon future deliveries,
positively refused to pay for the iron already delivered, and
for all which might subsequently be delivered, unless the
plaintiffs fulfilled a condition which the defendants in my
opinion had no right to impose." In other words, the refusal
to pay, if a real refusal at all, related not merelyto the amount
due for the iron already delivered, but for all which might be
delivered during the pendency of the petition, which might,
though in fact it did not, include several future deliveries,
and so was as much a breach by anticipation as to such pos468
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sible future deliveries as it was already an actual breach as
to the previous installment.
The decision was overruled by the Court of Appeals, and
it is submitted that the more attentive the study of the case
the more certain will be the conviction that this action was
based upon the different view taken by the upper Court as to
the failure to pay, not upon any difference as to the effect of
such a "positive refusal" as Coleridge conceived to exist.
All the judges refused to call the defendants' failure to
pay, either what was due or what might become due for iron
deliverable in future, a refusal, terming it rather "a demur,
a delay, a postponement." Selborne, L. J., "a hesitation."
Lindley, L. J., p. 666, held that so far from evidencing an
intention to repudiate the contract as entered into, it showed
on the defendants' side an embarrassment as to the possibility of carrying it out, and suggesting a mode of obviating it; in a word, so far from showing a desire to escape
performance. it showed rather an earnest effort to do so.1
The judges all quoted and approved the rule in Freeth v.
Burr to this extent, i. e., where the actual default showed no
intent to evade any obligation under the contract, it could
not amount to a breach thereof, though in fdct rendered an
exact literal performance impossible.
It is the relative conduct of the two parties which weighed
with the Court-the defendants, though guilty of a technical
breach, desirous of performing their contract if the plaintiffs will only aid them; the plaintiffs earnestly desirous of
escaping from a losing bargain. All the opinions leave open
the question of the effect of a positive refusal to pay; it is
upon the special circumstances that the Court bases its decision.
The House of Lords sustained the action of the Court
below, and here again is observable the same preponderating
weight attached to the character of the failure to pay as
being a mere demur-hesitation, etc., and as not amounting
to a positive refusal to carry otit a term of the contract' Sir Charles Russell, now Chief Justice: "The question is, whether
there is such a refusal to abide by a material term of the contract as
ought to be treated as a refusal to perform the contract." p. 655.
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and the same care to restrict the effect of the decision to its
own facts, and to leave untouched the effect of an absolute
unexplained refusal to perform a term of the contract.
On a close inspection of the opinions the various judges
appear to differ on almost every point, and yet arrive finally
at a unanimous decision of the case.
Lord Selborne held the contract to be entire. Lord Blackburn practically held it to be a group of separate contracts,
a breach of any of which could affect the others only so far
as it evidenced an intention to refuse future performance,
such as would amount to a breach by anticipation thereof.
Lord Selborne refused to discuss the earlier cases. approving
and applying the rule of Freeth v. Burr as he understood it.
Lord Blackburn distinguished them as cases where the
Court, apparently to his mind erroneously, had held the delivery of a certain amount per month to go to the root of the
consideration,' while Lord Bramwell says "he could not tell
why Hoare v. Rennie and Houck v. Muller have been
brought forward as bearing on the case in hand."
Lord Blackburn, while approving of Freeth v. Burr, understood it as an application of the doctrine of breach by
anticipation to divisible contract, stating it to be of the same
effect as Hochsterv. de la Tour, 2 El. & Bl. 678 (the leading
case on that subject), while Lord Selborne took it to be that
even though the breach be not of a condition precedent, if
the conduct of the party "amount to a renunciation, to an
absolute refusal, to perform the contract," 2 then the
party aggrieved may accept it as reason for not
performing his part; in other words, did the circumstances
surrounding the breach show any desire to avoid any of the
obligations of the contract, or indicate any inability to perform it as a whole, and considering this to be the rule, he,
the defendants'
in a critical analysis of the facts, held that
conduct so far from indicating a desire to avoid any of its
'As before pointed out in Hoare v. Rennie, the Court refused to allow
the question to be argued, and in Bowes v. Shand, Lord Blackburn
himself held all stipulations as to time and mode of performance to be
essential.
2 The contract entire, as he afterward states it to be not of the residue
alone.
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obligations, on the contrary showed them to be desirous of
doing all in their power to fulfill them as fully as was possible; an exact performance being put out of the question
by their honest mistake as to the company's power to accept
and receipt for a payment when due.
Upon only two points is there any practical unanimity of
opinion: (i) thatthedefendants"conductheredid notamount
to an absolute refusal to perform their contract, but was a
mere hesitation or demur caused by an honest reliance upon
mistaken legal advice, and that they in fact, so far from desiring to evade any of their obligations under their contract,
were able and anxious to fulfill them, and were suggesting
means whereby the difficulty might be escaped; and (2) that
the judges and law lords were most careful to restrict their
decision to the facts in hand, and to leave untouched the
effect of an absolute refusal to pay for any one installment.'
How far is this case decisive? Does it decide with Lord
Blackburn that the contract is not entire, or with Lord Selborne that it is? Is it not, after all, in viev of the conflict
of views expressed, authority only as its own facts or at
furthest facts so similar as to indicate, as also in Freeth v.
Burr,2 L. R., 9 C. P. 208, that the breach is but technical,
that the party in fault does not wish to repudiate, or escape
from any of his obligations, but is honestly desirous to fulfill
them .all exactly, and still able to do so in substantial though
of course not exact accordance with all of the stipulations
of the contract, notwithstanding the technical breach which
he has committed, owing to an honest mistake or to some
extraordinary position in which he may find himself placed,
without fault on his part? All beyond this would appear
mere dicta, and, as has been seen, conflicting dicta at that.
'Lord Blackburn seems to consider an absolute refusal to pay for
one installment could only be of effect as an indication of an intent to
refuse future payments, but, as Lord Coleridge pointed out, the refusal
here, if a refusal at all, relates to some, if not all, the future installments.
2 Where the party refused payment for one installment because of
prior delays, claiming the right to hold back one payment to secure
himself against future delays, but always announced his intention of
finally paying all due.
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Undoubtedly in this case justice was done. The plaintiff
company had attempted to escape from a losing contract by
alleging that it was ended by a technical breach committed
by parties earnestly desirous of keeping it in force and
anxious to arrive at some way whereby they could carry
out their part with safety to themselves; and if it be restricted as authority to its own facts, little can be said in
criticism of it as a decision upon the merits of the contestants.
It, however, is open to the same objections urged against
Freeth v. Burr, though perhaps to a less extent, more effect
being given to the character of the defendants' conduct in
this case as not amounting to a real refusal, a true breach at
all.
Like it, it allows the character of a default to set aside
the intention of the parties as expressed in their contract.
Sympathy for the hard position of a party innocently in
honest difficulties as to how he may safely perform his contract, overrides the necessity for certainty universally recognized as the first essential in commercial contract. In a
word, while good justice if restricted to its own facts, it is
perilously near bad law.
Scientifically there would seem to be but two positions
possible:
2
That taken in Hoare v. Rennie' and Houck v. Miller,
that the contract being entire, a breach of any part thereof
entitles the party aggrieved to terminate so much of the
contract as remains executory, and that indicated by Lord
Blackburn in Mersey v. Naylor, that such contracts are to be
construed not as intended to be one entire contract, but rather
as separate contracts for each installment to be performed
without relation to one another in one instrument, where of
course a breach of one can only affect the others when the
conduct of the party committing the breach amounts to a
breach by anticipation of the others.
Both give effect to the intention of the parties as it appears
to the Court from an inspection of the contract; they differ
only in the construction placed by the Court upon the con15

H. & N. ig.

2L. R., 7 Q. B. D.

92.

DIVISIBLE CONTRACT.

tract. Lord Blackburn indicates that such contracts may
show an intent under exceptional circumstances to regard
the various parts of the contract as essential one to the other,
the performance of each as vital to the full enjoyment of all;
but he indicates that, as a rule, he would hold each installment
as intended to be capable of being performed or broken
without affecting the value of the performance of the rest.
As a rule of construction the former appears obviously the
more accurate, besides having the support of the weight of
authority, including the opinion of Lord Selborne in Mersey
v. Naylor. The contract is usually for an entire amount,
the division of performance relating only to the time and
mode of performance. If the parties intended the contract to
be not divisible but divided, it would have been the most
simple and obvious plan to draw as many separate contracts
as there were to be deliveries, or in some other way indicate
that each delivery is without relation to the rest; and last,
but most important, a form of contract, apparently not only
the best, but the only form appropriate to provide for a constant and regular and orderly supply of goods or market
therefor, is taken to mean exactly the contrary, that any
amount delivered will be gladly accepted, any amount the
vendee may choose to take will be sold.
The contract on its face appears to be for an entire
amount. The form is one which appears admirably designed
to provide for the sale or purchase of a large amount of
goods, while allowing the vendor to provide from the receipts
for one delivery, the goods to be afterwards delivered, or the
vendee, by the sale of the first installment, to prepare for the
payment of the rest, to enable merchants to make sure of a
regular supply for the future without having to carry an
unnecessarily large stock on hand, or of a market for the
future without providing goods perhaps beyond their present
capacity; in a word, to provide with certainty for the future
without overstraining their present resources, and so to turn
over their capital the more quickly. To hold that by such a
form of contract they intend that they will supply or accept
any one or more installments without relation to the others
is to render useless this form of contract.
Of the two views, that of Lord Bramwell in Houck v.
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Miller seems by far the better; nor, as has been pointed out,
would the case of Mersey v. Naylor prevent the application
thereof to future English cases, save when similar exceptional circumstances existed; and this view of the construction of such contracts, and the effect thereon of an absolute
breach of any one installment, has the support of all but a
very small minority of the American Courts.'
Some slight confusion has resulted from an attempt by
Mr. Justice Gray to reconcile the English cases, as has been
seen hopelessly conflicting, as they are, by a distinction between the effect of a failure to deliver and a failure to pay
for one installment.
This attempted distinction is based on a dictum2 by Lord
Selborne in Mersey v. Navlor, and with all deference to Mr.
Justice Gray, it is submitted upon a mistaken view of the
2
dictum in question..
In Lord Selborne's opinion-it was the order of performance, not the character of it, which prevented the payment
from being a condition precedent-he makes no distinction
between a failure to pay and a failure to deliver; but he says
that since payment for each installment must be after delivery, it cannot be a condition precedent to that part, and
what cannot be a condition precedent of a part cannot be of
the whole. Had it been agreed that payment should precede
delivery, this same reasoning would make payment a condition precedent, and prevent a delivery of one portion being
a condition to the right to demand the future payment.
The leading case in the United States is that of Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188. The plaintiff had agreed to
sell 5,000 tons of iron to be shipped at the rates of "about"
I,OOO tons a month, beginning February Ist, the whole to
'The case of Gerti v. Poidebard, 57 N. J. L. 432, appearing to follow
Lord Blackburn's opinion in Mersey v. Naylor to its fullest extent.
2 It is found on page 439, L. R., 9 App. Cas. He says: "The contract
is entire; it is not split by the division of performance into as many
contracts as there are to be deliveries." He then says: "It is perfectly
clear that no particular payment can be a condition precedent of the
entire contract, because delivery was most certainly to precede payment,
and that being -so, I cannot see how, without express words, it can be
made a condition precedent to the subsequent fulfillment of the unfulfilled part of the contract."
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be completed by August Ist. He shipped only 400 in February, 88o in March, 1,571 in April, 850 in May, i,ooo in

June, and in July 300. The defendants received and paid
for the February shipments, being in ignorance that the full
I,OOO tons would not be shipped in that month; but in May,
just before the arrival of the March shipment, hearing for
the first time of the amounts shipped in February, March
and April, they wrote plaintiff's agents that they would
refuse the March and April shipments as not being in accordance to contract, and also refused to receive any future
shipments.
On the trial,' which took place before the decision of
Mcrsey v. Naylor, the Circuit Court being of opinion that
the defendants had the right to rescind, the plaintiff suffered a "non-suit," which the Court refused to take off.
Judge Butler, in a very able oral opinion, placing his opinion
firmly upon the ground that the contract being entire till
divided, performance by one party cannot be demanded till
the other has performed or tendered a performance on his
side, and that the contract being "severable" did not advance the plaintiff's position-"to make his position logical,
the contract must be held to be not one contract but several
distinct independent contracts ;" and while he considers that
in Simpson v. Crippin the English Courts have gone thus
far, he refuses to adopt their position, but says it is for the
Supreme Court to take such a step if they see fit.2
'5 Fed. Rep. 768.
2This opinion so admirably states the view that such contracts must
be governed by the ordinary rules of commercial law, that the following

rather lengthy extract may perhaps be pardoned: "The right to rescind

a contract for non-performance is a remedy as old as the law of contract itself. Where the contract is entire-indivisible--the right is
unquestioned. The undertakings on the one side, and on the other, are
dependent, and performance by one party cannot be enforced by the
other without performance, or a tender of performance, on his own part. In

the case before us the contract is 'severable.' But to say it is 'severable'
does not advance the plaintiff's argument. A 'severable' contract, as the
language imports, is a contract liable simply to be severed. In its origin,
and till severed, it is entire, a single bargain or transaction. The doctrine
of severableness (if I may be allowed to coin a word) in contracts is
an invention of the courts, in the interest of justice, designed to enable
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The Supreme Court upheld the action of the Court below, holding in accordance with Lord Selborne that the
contract was one entire contract, and not split into as many
contracts as there were shipments. These subsidiary provisions related to time and mode of performance of the
entire contract, and under Bowers v. Shand, such stipulations are of the essence of a mercantile contract. He held
the buyers' acceptance of the February shipment to be
no waiver, since done in ignorance that the stipulated quantity had not been shipped in that month, and finally, that the
plaintiff, asserting the contract to be still in force, is bound
to show such performance on his part as entitles him to demand it on theirs. Unfortunately, in an attempt to reconcile the English cases, a hopeless task, he distinguishes them
upon a difference between a failure to deliver and to pay one
installment. This is not necessary to the decision mere dictum, based upon what is, it is submitted, as before said. a
mistaken view of Lord Selborne's dictum in Mersey v.
Naylor.
one who has partially performed, and is entitled on such partial performance to somethihg from the other side, to sustain an action in
advance of complete performance,--as where goods are sold to be

\.
"J

delivered and paid for in parcels, to enable the seller to recover for the
parcels delivered, in advance of completing his undertaking. But this
equitable doctrine should not be invoked by one who has failed to perform, for the purpose of defeating the other's right to rescind, and
thus to protect himself against the consequences of his own wrong.
As against such a party the contract should be treated and enforced as
entire. To say, therefore, that the contract is 'severable' does not, I
repeat, advance the argument. To render the plaintiff's position logical,
it is necessary to take a step forward, and hold that such a transaction
(it would not be accurate in this view to call it a contract) constitutes
several distinct, independent contracts. Then, of course, it follows that
a failure as respects one of several successive deliveries affords no right
to rescind in regard to those yet to be made."
'In Mersey v. Naylor, supra.
2 Is not Lord Selborne's position this? Since each payment was subsequent to each delivery, the consideration for each delivery was the
valid unbroken promise to pay for each the consideration for the whole,
the valid unbroken promise to pay for all. So here the vendor has
practically obtained his consideration; notwithstanding a technical
breach of one promise to pay and a possible anticipatory technical
breach of some at least of the future payments, the circumstances show
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Therefore, it is not surprising to find in the case of Cresswell v. Martindale, 63 Fed. Rep. 86, a failure to accept and
pay for a large part of one installment of cattle delivered in
one month under such a contract for successive monthly
deliveries, held-the Court citing and professing to follow
Norrington v. Wright-to entitle the vendor to refuse to
make any further deliveries under his contract. In this case
also the default came not.as to the first installment, but in a
later portion after the contract had been in part executed
on both sides.
These two cases then establish fully that while a perfect
performance of one portion under the contract entitles the
party to an equivalent compensation, a failure of a party to
deliver or accept or pay for1 one installment at any stage of
the vendee able, willing and ever anxious to perform his promise
to pay. In other words, the circumstances show that the vendor has
obtained substantially the agreed consideration, a valid promise not
repudiated nor likely to be broken. Had the default been absolute, a
failure to pay, all the vendor would obtain would be a right of action
for damages for a broken promise, and not a promise still practically
certain of substantial fulfillment, and so such a breach would destroy the
consideration for the one and so render it impossible for the whole
consideration ever to be received. This view overlooks the fact that
the consideration for only the first installment is the promise to pay for
it; the consideration for the others, judged by the rules in Pordage v.
Cole, the promise to pay for it, and a proper orderly payment of the
previous portions. An existing promise as to the future and a full performance as to the past.
1No'distinction is made in the various state courts, except, perhaps,
New Jersey, between a failure to deliver and a failure to pay for one
installment. See Robson v. Bohn, 27 Minn. 333, and other cases cited
in Cresswell Co. v. Martindale. It is, however, only in cases of exceptional circumstances like Mersey v. Naylor and Freeth v. Burr that
the effect of a failure to pay or deliver can be different even in England,
and that not from any difference in the rule of law, but because it is
more easy to substantially perform a technically broken contract, notwithstanding the breach when the default is in payment and not in
delivery. Such circinmstances have not ,so far arisen in the American
cases-if they did it is possible that rather than allow injustice to a
party innocent of wrongful intent, the English rule, though unscientific,
might be applied; this, however, is mere conjecture, and it is to be
hoped that, in view of the confusion caused by these cases, the hardship
of an innocent wrongdoer, if so he may be termed, will not be allowed
to override the plain principles of commercial law.

BREACH OF ONE INSTALLMENT OF A

the contract entitles the other to at once terminate the contract and refuse further performance thereof.
This right of rescission, or rather of treating a breach as
terminating once for all a continuing contract, must be at
once exercised; if the breach be waived as to the installment
wherein it is committed, it can of course not be used as a
reason for refusing performance of the residue of the contract; so, if a defective installment be accepted, and retained
with knowledge of its imperfection, here, as in Boone v.
Eyre, the only remedy for the breach is a cross-action for
damages. Having accepted less, the agreed consideration
is waived, and in lieu of perfect performance the party is
taken to have agreed to accept the less and an action for
damages. The default must be treated as a breach for all
purposes or none.
Many cases1 which are often cited as establishing that a
failure as to one installment of a divisible contract will not
justify a termination of the whole are but applications of
this rule of waiver of breach. And it is owing to this very
misconception that the Pennsylvania cases are so often
quoted as
opposed to Hoare v. Rennie and Norrington v.
2
Wright.

In Reybold v. Voorhees, 30 Pa. 116, the seller of an entire crop of peaches, to be paid for weekly as delivered, was
held entitled to refuse to continue deliveries when a balance
due at the end of a week was unpaid. Here it is to be noted
the default was in payment, not in delivery, and the question
is clearly and directly presented and determined according
to Hoarev. Rennie.
The next case, Forsyth v. Oil Co., 53 Pa. 168, is somewhat analogous to Freeth v. Burr and Mersey v. Naylor.
The contract had been performed with great latitude on
both sides, and the vendor meeting the secretary of the
vendee company on the street, asked him for payment, which
Such is the case of Jonasohn v. Young, 4 Bog. 296, decided soon after
Hoare vu. Rennie, and often cited as opposed to it, but really turning
on the waiver of the breach by knowing acceptance and retention of
imperfect performance.
2As in Benjamin on Sales.
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was petulantly refused. The vendor then declared the contract at an end. That day everything due was paid. It was
held that the refusal was more seeming than real,' and that
since by mutual consent the contract had been construed
liberally, neither party could avail himself of a refusal to
perform it strictly as a breach without notifying the other
that he intended to insist on a literal compliance with the
terms. But the Court recognized that the right to terminate the contract would have existed but for the mutual
agreement that a strict performance was not required.
A number of Pennsylvania cases are often considered as
opposed to Hoare v. Rennie and Reybold v. Voorhees, and
supporting Simpson v. Crippin.
The first is Lucesco Oil Co. v. Brewer, 66 Pa. 351. There
was in that case no question raised as to the right of one
party to refuse to continue to perform a contract already
broken by the other. The only question was whether the
contract was so far entire that a party who had advanced
$71,ooo out of $75,000 promised could not recover because
of the failure to advance the whole, and to render certain
accounts of oil sold. It was a case where, as in Boone v.
Eyre, a party who had accepted and retained, the subetantial
consideration of his contract is seeking to evade paying
therefor by alleging that nothing was due till all was performed. It is this point and no other which the Court has
in view when it decides that owing to the apportionment
of the consideration the contract is severable and not entire,
and that it is the character of the consideration and not the
nature of the thing done which determines the contract to
be either severable or entire. If the contract be apportioned
or apportionable, it ii severable if not entire. Whether this
rule be a good or bad test2 whereby to decide as to the
'As in Mersey v. Naylor.
'It is submitted that the correct rule is that stated by Agnew, J., in
Shinn v. Bodine, 6o Pa. 182: "The entirety of a contract depends on
the intention of the party and not' the divisibility of the subject; the
severable nature of the latter may assist in determining the intention,
but cannot overcome it when discovered." And in that case this rule
was applied to a contract for the delivery of eight hundred tons of coal
on board vessels sent by vendee during August and September, at so

A
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severability, used in this sense, of a contract, it does not
touch in any way the question under discussion.
Morgan v. McKee, 77 Pa. 229, is also often considered
as supporting Simpson v. Crippin; however, their suit was
brought upon three separate agreements, each for 5oo barrels of oil. The defendants offered to prove that these three
formed part of one entire contract for 4,ooo barrels, which
was only for convenience split into eight separate agreements, and that the plaintiffs had failed to deliver the fifth
installment, which they alleged terminated their obligations
as to the remaining three in suit. The Court properly refused the offer, for to so do would have been to vary the
written agreements by parol, by showing each to be not
itself a contract, but a mere dependent part of a greater contract; besides, the Court held that the &,:iendants had not
acted promptly upon the discover, and that if they had ever
had a right to rescind, they must-be taken by their delay to
have waived it, and to have elected to treat the contract as
still existing.
This decision again does not touch the main qu'-..ion at
all, but merely decides a point of evidence that where the
parties have reduced their contracts to a written form, which
on its face shows them to be not merely severable but separate and independent, evidence cannot be given to show
they were something quite different; and, secondly, that by
undue delay a party is taken to have waived his right to
terminate the contract upon such a default.
So Scott v. Kittanning Coal Co., 89 Pa. 231, also considered by Benjamin and others as supporting Simpson v.
Crippin, will be found on inspection to turn upon the retention and use of the very coal the defective quality of which
was the breach alleged as terminating the contract. The
defendant could have refused the inferior coal, or if the defect was not immediately patent could have returned it when
its defects were discovered. If it was retained and used
much a ton. The contract was held to be entire, notwithstanding the
price being computed by the ton. There being no intent to sever the
performance discoverable from the right to ship in two months the case
was not brought within the rule of Brandt v.Lawrence (supra, Part I),

and there was no right to payment in advance of deliveries of all.
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it ceased to be a breach available to defeat recovery for the
payment for that very delivery, and so of course could not
be alleged as a ground for terminating the entire contract.
By its acceptance and retention it had become a subject for
action'of damages. It could not be used to defeat any of the
plaintiff's rights under the contract. All such effect had
been waived by its acceptance and use.
And in Rugg & Bogan v. Moore, iio Pa. 242, the last
Pennsylvania case directly on the point, the defendant had
sold by a parol contract six carloads of grain at a price per
bushel. One car arrived, and the accompanying drafts were
paid. The plaintiff refused to pay the drafts accompanying
the second car until all the cars were received. The defendant then terminated the contract, and refused to deliver
the remaining cars. The Supreme Court held that the severability of the contract was to be decided by the jury by
an application of the rule in Lucesco v. Brewer, supra. That
under the evidence they could not have consistently found
it entire, as there was a strong inference that the payment for
each car became due upon delivery, so long as the contract
remained unbroken, and the vendee had no right to withhold payment till all was delivered; and if the jury had so
found, a failure to pay for any one carload without sufficient
reason justified the vendor in rescinding his contract,
and if the right was exercised promptly the contract was
at an end. It was said that it was only where, as in Morgan
v. McKee, "the contract consisted of severable distinct and
independent parts, each of which could be performed without reference to the other, that a failure to perform one part
does not authorize the termination of the contract, and after
distinguishing Scott v. Kittanning Coal Co. as indicated
supra, Reybold v. Voorhees is quoted as decisive.
This case decides that the term "severable'! is understood
by that Court, as it is by Judge Butler," not as indicating a
group of separate contracts, but a contract where each part
is dependent upon the other, until by performance severed
from it, differing from an unseverable entire contract only
in this: that a strict orderly performance of a part shall en'In his opinion in Norrington v. Wright.
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title the party to compensation in advance of a tender of the
whole, since such is the intention of the parties as gathered
from the terms of the contract, and it is this intention which
must be discovered by the Court, or jury if the contract be
by parol, and which, when discovered, must govern. It is
well also to note that here the default was not in a failure
to deliver, but in a failure to pay for one installment, and
that a part had been fully performed on both sides. This
did not affect the right to terminate all that remained executory upon the happening of the breach.'
These Pennsylvania cases also show clearly how the right
to terminate a contract upon such a breach may be lost:
(i) by prior acquiescence in a loose inexact performance. 2
To then treat a failure to comply with the strict literal stipulations of the contract would be to allow one party to entrap
another into a default so as to escape his own obligations.
(2) By delay. The right must be asserted immediately after
breach, or will be taken to be waived. 3
(3) By the acceptance and retention of the imperfect performance of one installment, the defect in which is the breach
alleged. 4 The default must be treated as a breach for all
purposes or none. If may be waived once for all, or not at
all. If a defective performance be accepted it can never be
treated as freeing the party accepting from any of his obligations in regard to that installment, or for the future: the default must be remedied by damages.'
In New York the case of Pope v. Porter, lO2 N. Y. 366,
held that a failure to deliver one installment gave the vendee
the right to terminate the whole contract. 6 The term divisible was held properly applicable to contracts wherein
a part performance on the one side must be compensated by
a corresponding part performance of the other in advance of
any possibility of knowing whether the whole will ever be
'Though, of course, the breach did not affect the rights already vested
by the perfect prior part performance.
'Forsyth v. Oil Co., 53 Pa. I6I.
SMorgan v. McKee, 77 Pa. 229.
4
Scott v.'Kittanning, 89 Pa. 231.
5
As in Boone v. Eyre, supra, Part I.
The opinion of Finch, J., is well worth attentive study.

DIVISIBLE CONTRACT.

tendered. But this does not mean that a party must accept
a part performance in inverse order of his contract, but according to its terms.' The breach in Pope v. Porter was a
failure to deliver, but no weight is attached to this fact, and
in Clarke v. Garder, 21 N. Y. 339, the same effect is given
to a failure to pay for one installment.
The case of Stephenson v. Cady, 117 Mass. 6, often
quoted upon both sides, is both exceptional in its facts, and is
of little authority beyond them in either.
There were three separate contracts, the only connection
being that the deliveries of the second were to begin when
those of the first were complete. The vendee refused to pay
a draft for certain goods delivered under the first contract,
unless security was given for the fulfillment of all
the contracts; and this was held to be broad enough
to be treated as a general refusal to make any further
payments, and so a breach by anticipation of the
whole of the contracts, citing Withers v. Reynolds,
2 B. & Ad. 882, and Bloomer v. .Bernstein, L. R., 9
C. P. 588.2 Here there was not one contract with stipulations as to severance of performance, but three separate contracts without anything to show them to be anything other
than they appeared, independent of each other, except that
if the delivery of all under the first contract were excused by
a breach thereof, there could be no obligation to deliver
anything under the second. Still the connection is but
slight, and the case of the nature of Morgan v. McKee (77
Pa. 229, supra) rather than Hoare v. Rennie, and a proper
subject for the doctrine of breach by anticipation. Besides,
the Court does not say a bare refusal to pay would not have
been sufficient to justify a rescission of the first contract
or of all. It says it is more than a bare refusal; it relates
also to all future payments.
'The cases of Tipton v. Feitner,

20

N. Y.

423;

Sickell v. Pattison,

14 Wendell, 257; Swift v. Opdyke, 43 Barbour 274, Per Lee v.Beebe, i3

Hun. 89, are all instances of this effect of a severance of performance
in a state where, if a contract is entire, the rule that all must be tendered before anything is due has been very stoutly applied. Catlin v.
Tobias,
26 N. Y. 217.
2

See Part I.

BREACH OF ONE INSTALLMENT.

It would be irksome to cite instances in every jurisdiction.
Suffice it to say that with few exceptions throughout the
States of the Union, it is now settled law that a contract
where the thing sold is to be delivered in installments and
corresponding payments made, an orderly part performance
gives the right to a proportionate payment without regard to
any future performance or breach of the residue. But if
either party be guilty of a breach either in delivery or payment, either as to the first or any subsequent portion, then
the other party at his option may terminate all of the contract which is still executory, though such termination does
not affect the rights already vested by an orderly part performance.
In New Jersey' and Iowa Lord Blackburn's view in
Mersey v. Naylor seems to be followed. The severance of
performance makes the contract not merely divisible, but so
far separate and independent that a breach as to one can
only affect those subsequently to be performed when the circumstances surrounding show it to amount to a breach by
anticipation as to them.
FrancisH. BoMen.

'Gerli v. Poidebard, 57 N. J. Law
' Wheeler v. Myer, 65 Iowa, 390.
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